Perspectives on the Alledged Halutz Stock Scandal …



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Analysis: Unworthy of Command? By Yaakov Katz and Anshel Pfeffer (Jerusalem Post)

“He was handpicked by prime minister Ariel Sharon to replace the deposed Moshe Ya’alon and lead the disengagement from Gush Katif and Northern Samaria. Halutz was seen as Sharon’s protege and many believed that after his term as chief, the next stage would be the political scene, perhaps even as Sharon’s successor.”


Despite severe criticism of the management of the second Lebanon war, IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz had been expected to survive with his career intact. Some generals were expected to pay with their heads for a campaign that ended with 118 soldiers dead and failed to achieve any of its original goals, but not Halutz.

He was an inseparable part of the trio – together with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz – that directed the war, and was effectively untouchable. All three knew that their political survival was linked, and therefore they resolutely backed each other when things weren’t going according to plan.

But now that Halutz’s priorities have been revealed for all the nation to see by the report in Maariv on the liquidation of his stock portfolio hours after the war erupted, there is nothing Olmert and Peretz can do to save him.

Halutz will now become the focus for all the growing public anger over the sacrifice of so many lives and resources for so little gained. His selfish attention to his personal fortune will be seen as a symbol of the incompetence and arrogance that many believe were at the root of this war’s failures.

“Halutz never sat in a tank,” a member of the General Staff said in the early days of the war. “How can he be expected to lead a war on the ground?”

His career as a pilot wasn’t the only detail that set Halutz apart from previous army chiefs. He was handpicked by prime minister Ariel Sharon to replace the deposed Moshe Ya’alon and lead the disengagement from Gush Katif and Northern Samaria. Halutz was seen as Sharon’s protege and many believed that after his term as chief, the next stage would be the political scene, perhaps even as Sharon’s successor.

At the ceremony marking the handing-over of the Defense Ministry from Shaul Mofaz to Peretz, Halutz seemed to be acting as the benevolent patron of the green Peretz. Ever since, he has been acting as the nation’s responsible grown-up, making three times more media appearances than Peretz and Olmert, especially since the war broke out.

It seemed at times as if they were working for him, instead of being his democratically elected masters. But when Halutz needed to evade responsibility, he was quick to remind everyone that the army only carries out the government’s orders.

Halutz, senior officers said, tried pinning the blame for the operation’s failure on OC Northern Command Udi Adam. With the appointment of Deputy Chief of General Staff Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky as his personal representative in the North, Halutz sent a message to the public that he was dissatisfied with Adam’s management of the war. Adam, officers said, was being set up to take the fall for Halutz and the rest of the General Staff.

Halutz’s actions are not deemed criminal. This was not insider trading in stocks and shares. His crime is of a totally different order and it falls within the jurisdiction of a much wider court. Halutz’s main excuse on Tuesday morning was that his private finances are his own business. By saying that he only proved that he totally misunderstood the job he’s had for the last 14 months.

The Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces is not the CEO of the army, and neither is he the commander in chief. He is the man ultimately responsible for the lives of each and every one of the soldiers and officers under his command and he is entrusted with ensuring Israel’s physical survival, not only during his tenure but also into the future. In a country still facing existential danger, now and in the foreseeable future, this is a sacred trust. By placing that phone call to his broker, three hours after the capture of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev and the deaths of eight other soldiers, Halutz betrayed that sacred trust.

Halutz really felt that rules pertaining to lesser mortals held no relevance for him. After the Six Day War, IDF officers were regarded as all-powerful demigods, until that hubris led to the terrible disaster of Yom Kippur. Since then a new generation of more realistic and humbler officers have taken over the army. Halutz, though, turned out to be a throwback to that previous age, when combat pilots were princes in the image of the cocksure Ezer Weizman.

Officers in the Northern Command were shocked on Tuesday by the news of what Halutz was doing at the exact moment that they were fueling tanks and APCs and preparing soldiers for the fierce battles to come. To think that the man who was supposed to be busy worrying about the loss of life expected in the war was more concerned about his personal financial loss and gain.

On Tuesday, Halutz praised the public for its quick mobilization for the war. Reservists dropped everything and headed up north to defend Israel. Commanders spoke of 100 percent turnout.

But how can a man like Halutz, who was worrying about his NIS 120,000 while soldiers were dying, relate in any way to reservists who left their businesses and families behind to march into Lebanon, with incomplete and outdated equipment and 40 kilo loads on their backs?

How can he ever look in the eyes of the parents, spouses and children of the fallen?

For Additional Perspectives, click; Why Did Halutz Sell Shares After Hizbullah Attack? By Hanan Greenberg and ANALYSIS: Halutz Must go Home When the Last Soldier Returns, By Amos Harel


  1. [...] For Dichter and Olmert, Peres, Peretz and Halutz – self-styled elitists, me-firstists, heretics at war with Shemayim — the security and wellbeing of the Jewish nation be damned. [...]

  2. [...] There is no question of the corruption on the political level. Olmert and cronies are. There is no question that the current chief of staff was more concerned with himself and his stock portfolio than with the state of the IDF at the crucial opening stage of the war — he was. There is no question that the war was mismanaged at both the political and command levels — it was. There’s no question that they had insufficient or no strategy, game plan or goal behind the war. Seemingly they didn’t and there is no question that the war was a “spin move” — it was, although one cannot figure why, except as a possible rationale for convergence: “See, we can beat the enemy at whatever borders!” And there is no question that they fought the war on the cheap and for the wrong reasons — they did. But for Yaalon to have spent the whole war writing about what the should be doing or should have done in the war and then, afterwards to say that it should not have been fought, that it was scandalous, is for the “bird to have had it’s head buried in the sand” as the war exposed for all to see and for panels to investigate and assign blame for the extent of the consequences of 6 years of Israeli neglect of the growing Hezbollah threat, some of this neglect time is on Yaalon’s clock. [...]

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